Epistorm · Northeastern University / CFA–CDC Insight Net
Epistorm
Insight Net

Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak — Democratic Republic of the Congo 2026

Epistorm Hub
Cumulative Cases
9,964
reported in DRC
Cumulative Deaths
4,841
CFR ≈ 49%
Patients in Isolation
1,008
in ETC/treatment facilities
Health Zones
66
affected in DRC
Provinces
8
affected in DRC
Uganda Confirmed Cases
20
2 deaths · no new cases
Kenya
9
confirmed
Nigeria
1
confirmed
PHEIC Declared
16 May 2026
WHO Director-General · IHR (2005)
Last updated · 24 October 2026
Overview

On 16 May 2026, following laboratory confirmation of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), the WHO Director-General determined that the outbreak constituted a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) under the International Health Regulations (2005). As of 19 October 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 9,637 cumulative cases and 4,646 cumulative deaths (case-fatality ratio approximately 48%) across 66 health zones spanning eight provinces. Uganda has reported no new cases, and its total remains 20 laboratory-confirmed cases including 2 deaths. As of 20 October, Kenya has confirmed 9 cases and Nigeria 1 case.

The Epistorm center at Northeastern University, supported by the CDC CFA Insight Net program, is providing quantitative risk assessments and analytical outputs in response to this outbreak. This hub aggregates all reports and analyses produced and is updated as the situation evolves.

Reports & Analysis
Forecast · updated weekly
The MOBS-GLEAM_BDBV forecast submitted each week to the InsightNet BDBV Modeling Hub: laboratory-confirmed cases in the DRC by week of symptom onset, with 100 model trajectories, intervals and the latest hub data. Latest round: about 462 confirmed cases in the reference week (25–31 October 2026) and 438 three weeks ahead (15–21 November).
Confirmed cases per onset week · median, 50 % and 90 % intervals
Report 9
Care-pathway transmission model with overdispersed transmission, updated with DRC reported cases to 30 September 2026 and checked against the 10 October count. Scenario selection across isolation levels, posterior R₀ and doubling time, effective reproduction number Rt, and projections to 31 October and 30 November 2026 under 50 %, 60 % and 75 % isolation, assessing whether the recent slowdown is a plateau or a decline.
Report 8
Mobility-only relative importation risk updated with the 7 October 2026 DRC data over a two-week projection horizon. Proximity spillover into DRC's neighbouring countries at the city level, and the international tail after removing Uganda (120 countries, 311 cities renormalised).
Report 7
Care-pathway transmission model updated with the 18 July 2026 confirmed-case count (2,090 cases in Ituri, ≤ 40 % ascertainment). Updated posterior R₀ and doubling time, three-scenario predictive posteriors in DRC on 1 August 2026, effective reproduction number Rt through end-September, and long-term outbreak-size and controllability metrics through 30 September 2026 under 30 %, 50 % and 75 % target isolation.
Report 6
Mobility-only relative importation risk updated with the 23 July 2026 DRC data over a two-week projection horizon. Proximity spillover into DRC's neighbouring countries at the city level, and the international tail after removing Uganda (117 countries, 281 cities renormalised).
Report 5
Care-pathway transmission model (community / HCF / ETC) with two-stage ABC calibration on cross-border importations and the 13 June 2026 confirmed-case count. Posterior R₀ and doubling time, 24 June projection in Ituri, and three isolation-rate scenarios (50 %, 75 %, 95 %) through 31 August 2026.
Report 4
Updated importation risk following the 2 June reopening of Bunia International Airport. Risk ranked across 208 international destinations beyond the immediate cross-border region.
Report 3
Conditional relative importation risk ranked across 197 international destinations. World choropleth and city-level analysis.
Report 2
Updated importation risk under the current expansion (Ituri, North Kivu, Kampala). Outbreak size estimated under three detected-export scenarios.
Report 1
Relative importation risk under two scenarios — Ituri Province as sole source, and the multi-province footprint spanning Ituri, North Kivu, and Kampala. Outbreak size estimated via ABC inference conditioned on two exported cases.